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Abstract
This work stresses the fact that all current proposals for electronic voting schemes disclose the
1nal tally of the votes. In certain situations, like jury voting, this may be undesirable. We present
a robust and universally veri1able membership testing scheme (MTS) that allows, among other
things, a collection of voters to cast votes and determine whether their tally belongs to some
pre-speci1ed small set (e.g., exceeds a given threshold)—our scheme discloses no additional
information than that implied from the knowledge of such membership. We discuss several
extensions of our basic MTS. All the constructions presented combine features of two parallel
lines of research concerning electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX-networks and in
homomorphic encryption.
c© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In a typical trial by jury in the United States, 12 jurors deliberate in private. A
foreman appointed by the judge among the jurors presides the deliberations. Jurors
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might be called upon to decide on several diEerent counts according to a policy which
may be complicated. Nevertheless, the simplest and most important jury verdicts are of
the binary type, e.g., innocent=guilty. In criminal cases unanimity is required in order
to reach a verdict. In civil cases there are diEerent standards, nine out of 12 votes are
representative numbers. Jury deliberations proceed in discussion rounds followed by
voting rounds. Voting is performed by raising hands. Hence, a typical requirement of
an election protocol, privacy of the votes, is not achieved. This opens the possibility of
biases on decisions due to jurors fear of rejection, a posteriori reprisals by interested
parties, and=or follow-the-leader kind of behavior. In fact, just knowledge of tallies can
cause undesirable follow-the-pack type conducts among jurors.
A ballot box system could be implemented in order to guarantee privacy. A subset
of the jury might be held responsible for tallying the votes and communicating to the
others whether a verdict has been reached. Still, this discloses the 1nal tally to a subset
of the jury and allows them to manipulate the deliberation process. An outside third
party (e.g., a judge, government employee, etc.) could be responsible for tallying the
votes, but this would cast doubts on the whole process since it allows for outside jury
manipulation, could cause undesirable leaks on how the jury is leaning, etc.
We provide an electronic drop in procedure for jury voting in the presence of curious
media, interested parties, dishonest court employees, and conGictive jury members,
that reveals nothing besides whether the 1nal tally exceeds or not a given threshold
value. We stress that we do not question the adequacy of the way in which juries
deliberate. There are good reasons to encourage jurors to express clearly and openly
their opinions. The point is that the way in which juries deliberate is just one familiar
example, among many, where it is clear that the voting procedure itself has an eEect on
the 1nal outcome. In particular, our work is motivated by the observation that voting
procedures that disclose 1nal tallies may be undesirable. This situation occurs whenever
small groups wish to make a yes=no type decision by majority vote, e.g., whether
to accept or reject a paper submitted to a cryptology conference—the cryptographers
program committee problem, to con1rm or not someone as president of a committee or
chair of a department, whether or not to send an invitation to a speaker, or to decide
whether to go forth with a given investment.
Our main procedure also provides a novel solution for the problem of computing
partial information from private data, which includes among others, the ’scoring’ prob-
lem. In the latter, a person is willing to answer some very sensitive questions to a
group of evaluators (say for a job interview or insurance application). Answers are
coded as integer values and might be weighted diEerently depending on the question.
Evaluators would like to learn whether the weighted score of the answers T exceeds a
given threshold or belongs to a set S of “satisfactory” values. The respondent wishes
to keep private the answers to each individual question. A solution satisfying both
requirements can be obtained by using a threshold voting scheme. Here, answers to
diEerent questions are seen as votes coming from diEerent individuals. The (weighted)
sum T of these “votes” is tested for membership in the set S of “satisfactory” values.
This work’s main scheme provides a solution to this problem and guarantees that only
one bit of information is released: whether the “tally” T belongs or not to the given
set S.
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The 1rst electronic voting scheme proposals focused on breaking the correspondence
between the voters and the vote casted. Afterward, several other desirable properties
of electronic voting schemes (besides correctness, privacy, and eLciency) were iden-
ti1ed, e.g., robustness, availability, non-duplication, universal veri1ability, and non-
coercibility. Electronic voting protocols satisfying diEerent subsets of the latter proper-
ties were designed. Nevertheless, all of them reveal the 1nal vote tally. In this work we
propose a cryptographic procedure for addressing this problem and stress its relevance
by describing other applications.
1.1. Related work
Voting schemes where one wants only one bit of information regarding the outcome,
like the ones discussed in the previous section, can be cast in the framework of secure
multi-party computation. Thus, plausibility results, asserting that such voting schemes
can be in principle built, can be obtained. Indeed, the application of general techniques
like the ones proposed in [33,17,8] yield such constructions. Unfortunately, the solutions
thus obtained do not exhibit some of the properties one desires of an electronic voting
scheme (e.g., non-interaction among voters). On the contrary, homomorphic voting
protocols, MIX-network based protocols, and veri1able secret sharing protocols are,
in general, more eLcient and require less communication than general purpose secure
multi-party computation protocols.
Electronic voting schemes are one of the prime examples of secure multi-party com-
putation. This partly explains why they have been intensively studied. The 1rst elec-
tronic election scheme in the literature was proposed by Chaum [15]. His work is based
on a realization of a computational secure anonymous channel called the MIX-network.
Anonymous channels and election schemes are closely related. Indeed, an anonymous
channel hides the correspondence between senders and receivers. An election scheme
requires hiding the correspondence between the voters and their votes. Since Chaum’s
work, several other electronic election schemes based on untraceability networks have
been proposed. Among the earlier ones are [12,16,27,48,52]. More recent proposals of
these type are those of [44,40,9,34]. Improving the eLciency and robustness of MIX-
networks has also been a major focus of attention [45,36,1,37,2,25,46,39,3,28,44,40,34].
(For actual implementations of MIX-networks see [54] and the references therein.)
In contrast to the above mentioned schemes, [20,7,5] introduced ones that do not
rely on the use of anonymous channels. In these schemes, ballots are distributed over
a number of tallying authorities through a special type of broadcast channel. Rather
than hiding the correspondence between the voter and his ballot, the value of the vote
is hidden. Among these latter type of schemes are [51,6]. More recent proposals are
[22,23,53,35,4].
The problem of testing whether some value belongs to a prede1ned set without
revealing the tested value or the content of the set is related to performing “blind
queries on databases”, or private information retrieval [19,32]. Indeed, in the case of
a single voter with vote v, and assuming the contents of set S are not known to
the voter, a procedure that answers whether or not v is in set S yields a method of
searching for v on the “database” S without revealing neither the target value v nor the
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contents of the database. The reader is referred to [42] for an in-depth survey on this
topic.
Recently, Boudot [10] proposed a scheme to securely prove that a committed number
T lies in a speci1c interval [a; b]. Although eLcient, it strongly relies on the prover’s
knowledge of T . However, in the jury setting there is no single entity allowed to know
the tally T . Hence, as presented and without resorting to secure multi-party computation
techniques, Boudot’s scheme does not immediately provide a solution to the jury voting
problem. In contrast, our proposed scheme can handle not only interval sets, but also
arbitrary sets.
This paper’s proposal crucially relies on the feasibility of checking whether two
ciphertexts encode the same plaintext without any party performing a decryption. A
procedure for eLciently performing such equality test, for ElGamal type ciphertexts,
has also been used in [11,14,38]. But, it at least dates back to [29].
1.2. Our contributions
This work’s 1rst contribution is that it stresses the fact that all current proposals
for electronic voting schemes disclose the 1nal tally of the votes. As discussed above
this may be undesirable in some situations. Our main technical contribution is a cryp-
tographic protocol to which we refer as membership testing scheme (MTS). Given a
1xed sequence of integers c1; : : : ; cn and sets S1; : : : ; Sn, it allows a collection of par-
ties P1; : : : ; Pn to cast values v1; : : : ; vn, where vi ∈ Si, and determine whether
∑
i civi
belongs to some pre-speci1ed small set S.
Based on our MTS we obtain a drop in replacement electronic procedure for a civil
case jury voting protocol by letting n=12, c1 = · · · = cn=1, S1 = · · · = Sn= {0; 1},
and S = {9; 10; 11; 12} (simpler schemes can be devised for criminal type trials, so
we will focus on the more challenging civil type case). For the sake of simplicity
of exposition, we discuss our results in the terminology of jury systems. Thus, for
notational and mnemonic purposes we refer to parties P1; : : : ; Pn as voters and denote
them by V1; : : : ; Vn, to the values v1; : : : ; vn as votes, and to
∑
i civi as the tally. Our
main MTS satisfy the following properties:
• Eligibility: Only authorized voters can vote and none more than once.
• Correctness: If all participants are honest, the correct output is generated.
• Robustness: The system can recover from the faulty or malicious behavior of any
(reasonably sized) coalition of participants.
• Computational privacy: A voter ballot’s content will be kept secret from any (rea-
sonably sized) coalition of parties that does not include the voter.
• Universal veri1ability: Ensures that any party, even a passive observer, can check
that ballots are correctly cast, only invalid ballots are discarded, and the published
1nal tally is consistent with the correctly cast ballots.
• No-duplication: No one can duplicate anyone else’s vote.
We also exhibit variants to our main MTS that establish trade-oEs between some of
the above listed features and eLciency of the overall scheme.
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In our scheme the voters send in a ballot identical to those proposed in [23], i.e., an
ElGamal ciphertext representing his=her vote plus a proof that the ciphertext is indeed a
valid ballot. Hence, as in [23], both the computational and communication complexity
of the voter’s protocol is linear in the security parameter k—thus optimal. 3 Moreover,
for any reasonable security parameter, the voters’ protocol remains the same even if
the number of voters varies. Assuming m authorities, the work performed by each
authority is O(((m+k)|S|+n)k). Moreover, the computational complexity of verifying
each authority’s work is proportional to the work performed by each authority. As in
[23] the work needed to verify that a voter sent in a well-formed ballot is O(k) per
voter.
Our MTS proposal combines features of two parallel lines of research concerning
electronic voting schemes, those based on MIX-networks (a la [15]) and in homomor-
phic encryption schemes (a la [20,7,5]). We use homomorphic (ElGamal) encryption
in order to hide the vote tallies. Speci1cally, our MTS relies on the homomorphic
properties of ElGamal to construct a ciphertext of the vote tallies. Moreover, it uses
MIX-networks (ElGamal based) in order to hide the value of the members of S. This
is achieved by generating a randomly permuted list of ciphertexts of elements in S.
We rely on special properties of the ElGamal cryptosystem in order to perform an
equality test between the tally’s ciphertext and each of the ciphertexts corresponding
to an element of S. Thus, our MTS proposal crucially relies on the possibility of testing
whether two ElGamal ciphertexts correspond to the same plaintext, without any of the
parties involved performing a decryption.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other cryptographic protocols which rely
both on homomorphic encryption schemes and MIX-networks are the independent re-
cent proposals of Hirt and Sako [35] and Jakobsson and Juels [38]. But, our MTS
combines both theses schemes in a novel way. Indeed, Hirt and Sako’s proposal uses
a MIX-network in order to randomly permute, for each voter, potential ballots, while
Jakobsson and Juels’ scheme permutes truth tables rows to compute the output of each
Boolean gate of a circuit. In contrast, our MTS relies on MIX-networks in order to
randomly permute the elements of the pre-speci1ed set S on which one desires to test
membership.
The applications we provide for our MTS constitute novel uses of MIX-networks.
A feature of these applications is that they rely on the capacity, that the overwhelming
majority of MIX-network proposals exhibit, to randomly permute and encrypt a list of
ElGamal ciphertexts. On the contrary, they do not use the decryption capabilities that
accompany most MIX-network proposals. By combining MIX-networks with eLcient
and available cryptographic protocols (namely, veri1able secret sharing and homomor-
phic voting), this paper gives a 1rst (practical) solution to the mentioned jury voting
problem that does not rely on general secure multi-party computation techniques.
We propose several implementations of a MTS. Our 1rst proposal relies on the
homomorphic encryption based electronic election scheme of Cramer et al. [23] and
the MIX-network of Abe [1]. We also discuss alternative implementations of our MTS
3 Throughout, a modular multiplication of O(k) bit sized numbers will be our unit with respect to which
we measure computational costs.
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based on the MIX-network proposals of [36,25,28,44,40,34] as opposed to that of
[1]. Our diEerent MTS implementations exhibit diEerent properties depending on the
previous work we use to build them.
Organization: In Section 2, we informally outline the protocol and discuss the build-
ing blocks on which our basic MTS proposal relies. In Section 3, we describe and
analyze our MTS and use it for building an electronic drop in replacement for a jury
voting protocol that reveals nothing besides whether the 1nal tally exceeds or not a
given threshold. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss variants and other applications of our
basic scheme. We conclude in Section 7 discussing a feature of all of the MTSs that
we propose and some desirable future developments.
2. Preliminaries
We work in the model introduced by Benaloh et al. (see [20,7,5,23]), where par-
ticipants are divided into n voters V1; : : : ; Vn and m authorities A1; : : : ; Am called active
parties. Al parties are limited to have polynomially-bounded computational resources
and have access to a so-called bulletin board whose characteristics we describe below.
In the sequel we assume that a designated subset of active participants on input 1k ,
where k is a security parameter, jointly generate the following system values: a k bit
long prime p, a large prime q such that q divides p − 1, and generators g and h of
an order q multiplicative subgroup Gq of Z∗p. The generators g and h are assumed
to be uniformly and independently chosen among the generators of Gq. One way for
participants to collectively generate these system values is to run the same probabilistic
algorithm over jointly generated uniformly and independent coinGips.
Conventions: Henceforth, unless otherwise speci1ed, all arithmetic is performed
modulo p except for arithmetic involving exponents which is performed modulo q.
Throughout this paper, x∈R  means that x is chosen uniformly at random from .
Furthermore, negligible and overwhelming probability correspond to probabilities that
are at most (k) and at least 1− (k), respectively, where (k) is a function vanishing
faster than the inverse of any polynomial in the security parameter k. A non-negligible
probability is said to be signi1cant.
2.1. Protocol overview
The protocol consists of 1ve main stages. (Setup, MIX, Verification, Voting and
Output). In the setup phase, shared parameters subsequently used in the protocol are
selected. In the mix phase, the list of encryptions of the elements in a 1xed set S is
shuRed by a MIX-network. To shuRe the list means permuting it while re-randomizing
each of its entries. Hence, the MIX-network’s output is a randomly permuted list of re-
encryptions of elements in S. Next, in the voting stage, each voter posts an encryption
of his vote (using the authorities’ jointly generated public-key) and a publicly veri1able
proof that the encryption corresponds to a valid vote [23]. Using the homomorphic
property of the underlying encryption scheme the authorities proceed to compute the
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encryption of the tally. Finally, in the output stage, each element of the MIX-network’s
output list is compared with the encryption of the tally to test whether they encrypt the
same plaintext. This stage is performed in such a way that the authorities do not actually
decrypt the tally nor the encryption of any element in the shuRed list. Moreover, no
information concerning any of the plaintexts involved is revealed. Instead a “blinded”
copy of the diEerence between the tally and each element in the shuRed list is implicitly
decrypted. The protocol relies on the fact that discrete exponentiation is injective to
unequivocally identify an encryption of 1, and therefore, when two encrypted values
are the same. The veri1cation stage checks whether all previous phases were correctly
performed.
2.2. Building blocks
Bulletin board: The communication model used in our MTS consists of a public
broadcast channel with memory, usually referred too in the literature as bulletin board.
Messages that pass through this communication channel can be observed by any party
including passive observers. Nobody can erase, alter, nor destroy any information.
Every active participant can post messages in his own designated section of a bulletin
board. This requires the use of digital signatures to control access to distinct sections
of the bulletin board. Here we assume a public-key infrastructure is already in place.
This suLces for computational security. Note that it is implicitly assumed that denial-
of-service attacks are excluded from consideration (see [23] for a discussion of how
to implement a bulletin board in order to achieve this).
Distributed key generation protocol (DKG): A DKG protocol allows parties A1;
: : : ; Am to, respectively, generate private outputs s1; : : : ; sm, called shares, and a public
output y= gs such that the following requirements hold:
• Correctness: There is an eLcient procedure that on at least t+1 shares submitted
by honest parties and the public values produced by the DKG protocol, outputs the
unique secret value s, even if up to t shares come from faulty parties. Honest parties
coincide on the public key y= gs and s∈R Zq.
• Secrecy: No information on s can be learned by the adversary except what is implied
by the value y= gs (for a formal de1nition in terms of simulatability see [31]).
The 1rst DKG protocol was proposed by Pedersen [49]. Henceforth in this work, DKG
refers to the protocol presented in [31] and shown to be secure in the presence of an
active adversary that can corrupt up to t¡n=2 parties.
ElGamal encryption and robust (threshold) proof of equality of encryptions: Our
MTS relies on a robust threshold version of the ElGamal cryptosystem [26] proposed
in [23]. Recall that in ElGamal’s cryptosystem x∈Gq is encrypted as (; )= (gr; yrx)
for r ∈R Zq, where y= gs is the public key and s is the secret key. In a robust threshold
version of the ElGamal cryptosystem, the secret key and public key are jointly generated
by the intended ciphertext recipients by means of a DKG protocol like the one described
above.
A robust threshold ElGamal cryptosystem has a feature on which all our MTS pro-
posals rely. This property allows checking whether a ciphertext encodes the plaintext
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1 without either decrypting the message nor reconstructing the secret s. We now recall
the discussion in [29] on how to perform such check eLciently. Indeed, assume (; )
is an ElGamal encryption of message x, that is (; )= (gr; yrx). Verifying whether it
is an encryption of x=1 boils down to checking if (s
′
)s= s
′
, where s′ is a randomly
distributed shared secret that eEectively “blinds” the decryption of (; ). The aforemen-
tioned equality can be veri1ed by m parties each holding distinct shares s1; : : : ; sm and
s′1; : : : ; s
′
m of the secrets s and s
′ without reconstructing either secret. To achieve this,
participant j commits to her secret shares sj and s′j by posting yj = g
sj and y′j = g
s′j in
her designated area of the bulletin board. Then, three distributed exponentiation (DEx)
protocols are executed (two for computing ′= s
′
and ′= s
′
and the last one to
check that (′)s= ′). Such protocol on input  outputs s by means of the following
steps:
(1) Participant j posts !j = sj and proves in zero knowledge that logg yj = log !j
using the protocol of [18] for proving equality of discrete logs described in Ap-
pendix A. The protocol satis1es special soundness and is honest-veri1er zero-
knowledge [23]. This suLces for our application. In order to make the protocol
non-interactive the Fiat–Shamir heuristic is used. This requires a cryptographi-
cally strong hash function. We henceforth refer to this non-interactive proof as
Proof-Log(g; yj; ; !j).
(2) Let # denote any subset of t+1 participants who successfully passed the zero
knowledge proof and let $j;# denote the appropriate Lagrange interpolation coef-
1cients. The desired value can be obtained from the following identities:
s =
∏
j∈#
!$j;#j ; $j;# =
∏
l∈#\{j}
l
l− j :
ElGamal ballots and e>cient proofs of validity: In our MTS each voter will post
an ElGamal encryption on the bulletin board. The encryption is accompanied by a
proof of validity that shows that the ballot is indeed of the correct form. To implement
this, consider a prover who knows x∈{x0; x1} and wants to show that an ElGamal
encryption of x, say (; )= (gr; yrx), is indeed of this form without revealing the
value of x. The prover’s task amounts to showing that the following relation holds:
logg  ∈ {logy(=x0); logy(=x1)}:
Building on [21], an eLcient witness indistinguishable (honest-veri1er zero-know-
ledge) proof of knowledge for the above relation was proposed in [23]. For com-
pleteness sake we review it as well as a non-interactive version of it in Appendix B.
Henceforth, Proof-Ballot{x0 ; x1}(; ) denotes this (non-interactive) proof.
Universally veri?able MIX-network: A MIX-network for ElGamal ciphertexts con-
sists of a bulletin board and a collection of authorities called MIX-servers. It takes
a list of ElGamal ciphertexts, permutes them according to some (secret) permutation,
and outputs an ElGamal re-encryption of the original list (without ever decrypting the
original list of ciphertexts).
We now describe a MIX-network proposal due to Abe [1] which in addition to
the aforementioned properties satis1es: correctness, robustness, privacy, and universal
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veri1ability. MIX-servers 1rst run the DKG protocol and jointly generate a secret
s and a public y. Initially, the bulletin board contains a list of ElGamal ciphertexts
((G0; l; M0; l))l where M0; l=mlyt0; l and G0; l= gt0; l for ml ∈Gq and t0; l ∈R Zq. (To avoid
the attack shown in [50] a proof of knowledge of t0; l must accompany (G0; l; M0; l).)
The list of ElGamal ciphertexts is re-randomized and permuted by the cascade of MIX-
servers. Server j chooses a random permutation 'j of S, picks tj; l ∈R Zq for each l,
reads ((Gj−1; l; Mj−1; l))l from the bulletin board, and posts ((Gj; l; Mj; l))l in the bulletin
board where
Gj;l = Gj−1;'j(l)g
tj;l and Mj;l = Mj−1;'j(l)y
tj;l :
Processing proceeds sequentially through all servers.
Lemma 1 (Abe [1]). Under the intractability of the Decision Di>e–Hellman prob-
lem, given correctly formed ((Gj−1; l; Mj−1; l))l and ((Gj; l; Mj; l))l, no adversary can
determine 'j(l) for any l with probability signi?cantly better than 1=|S|.
An additional protocol, referred to as Protocol-(, is executed in order to prove the
correctness of randomization and permutation to external veri1ers as well as convince
honest servers that they have contributed to the output, i.e., no one has canceled the
randomization and permutation performed by the honest servers (with success proba-
bility signi1cantly better than a random guess). For completeness sake we review this
protocol as well as a non-interactive version of it in Appendix C. A non-interactive ver-
sion of Protocol-( can be derived through standard techniques. We henceforth denote
this (non-interactive) version by Proof-(. (See details in [1].)
Our MTS can be based on any re-encrypting MIX-network with the mentioned char-
acteristics. Other alternatives will be discussed later on.
3. Membership testing scheme (MTS)
In what follows, N denotes the cardinality of the set S for which one seeks to
verify whether it contains the vote tally. Henceforth, i runs over {1; : : : ; n}, j runs
over {1; : : : ; m}, and l runs over S. We work in the model described in the previous
section where the active set of participants is V1; : : : ; Vn (the voters) and A1; : : : ; Am (the
authorities). Voters and authorities might overlap.
3.1. Basic MTS protocol
Input
(1) Public input: System parameters, i.e., a k bit long prime p, a prime q¿n that
divides p−1 and generators g and h of an order q multiplicative subgroup Gq of Z∗p
(elements g and h are uniformly and independently generated). A set S ⊂{1; : : : ; n}.
(2) Private input for voter Vi: A vote vi ∈{0; 1}.
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Goal
To determine whether
∑
i vi belongs to S without revealing anything else besides
this bit of information.
Setup phase
(1) Using the DKG protocol A1; : : : ; Am jointly generate the public value y= gs, where
s∈R Gq, and the private shares s1; : : : ; sm. Authorities commit to their share sj of s
by posting yj = gsj in their designated bulletin board area.
(2) Using the DKG protocol, authorities jointly generate, for each l∈ S, the pub-
lic value yl= gs
′
l , where s′l ∈R Zq, and the private shares s′l;1; : : : ; s′l;m. Authorities
commit to their share s′l; j of s
′
l by posting y
′
l; j = g
s′l; j in their designated area of
the bulletin board.
MIX phase
(1) Let ((G0; l; M0; l))l be a list such that G0; l=1 and M0; l= h−l for each l∈ S.
(2) Authority Aj chooses at random a permutation 'j of {1; : : : ; N}, for each l picks
tj; l ∈R Zq, and posts the list ((Gj; l; Mj; l))l such that for each l∈ S,
Gj;l = Gj−1;'j(l)g
tj;l and Mj;l=Mj−1;'j(l)y
tj;l :
Verification phase
Authorities cooperate to issue Proof-(, a honest-veri1er zero-knowledge (non-
interactive) proof that shows that they know random factors and permutations
that relate ((G0; l; M0; l))l with ((Gm; l; Mm; l))l. Each authority signs Proof-( in
order to insure veri1ers of the presence of an authority they can trust. Each
authority checks the proof. If the check succeeds the result is declared VALID.
If it fails, dishonest authorities are identi1ed (and removed) by means of the
tracing capabilities that Proof-( provides. The remaining authorities restart from
the beginning of the MIX Phase.
Voting phase
Voter Vi chooses ri ∈R Zq and posts an ElGamal encryption representing his vote
vi, say (i; i)= (gri ; yri hvi), and Proof-Ballot{h0 ; h1}(i; i). Each authority checks
the proof. If the check fails the ballot is declared incorrect.
Output phase
(1) Each authority computes =
∏
i i and =
∏
i i over all correctly issued ballots.
(2) Using the DEx protocol, for each l∈ S, authorities compute
G′l = (Gm;l)
s′l and M ′l = (Mm;l)
s′l :
Then, using the DEx protocol again, authorities verify whether (G′l)
s=M ′l for
some l in S. In the aLrmative case they output MEMBER, otherwise NON-
MEMBER.
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Remark 2. Note that both the MIX Phase and the Verification Phase may be pre-
computed before the voting begins. In fact, if the Verification Phase is not declared
VALID, there is no need to perform the Voting Phase.
Electronic jury voting protocol: We conclude this section with a simple observa-
tion; an electronic analog of a 12-juror civil case voting protocol where 9 votes suf-
1ce to reach a verdict can be derived from our Basic MTS by letting n=12 and
S = {9; 10; 11; 12}.
4. Analysis
4.1. Eligibility
The non-anonymity of ballot casting insures that only authorized voters cast ballots.
Indeed, recall that voters must identify themselves through digital signatures in order
to post their vote onto their designated area of the bulletin board. This also insures
that no voter can cast more than one ballot.
4.2. No-duplication
Follows from requiring each voter to compute the challenge in the (non-interactive)
proof of validity of ballots as a hash of, among others, a unique public key identifying
the voter.
4.3. Correctness
Clearly, an honest voter can construct a ballot and its accompanying proof of validity.
Moreover, the following holds
Theorem 3. If all participating authorities are honest, then they will output MEM-
BER if and only if the tally of the validly cast votes belongs to the set S.
Proof. In addition to the notation introduced in Section 3, for j6m let 'j;:::;m denote
'j ◦ 'j+1 ◦ · · · ◦ 'm and ' denote '1 ◦ · · · ◦ 'm. Assuming that all participants in the
Basic MTS are honest,
Gm;l = g+m;l and Mm;l = y+m;lh−'(l);
where
+m;l =
∑
j
tj;'j;:::;m(l) and , =
∑
i
ri:
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Hence, since y= gs, = g, and =y,h
∑
i vi ,
(G′l)
s = ys
′
l (+m;l+,) and M ′l = y
s′l (+m;l+,) · hs′l (
∑
i vi−'(l)): (1)
If
∑
i vi ∈ S, for l= '−1(
∑
i vi), it holds that '(l)=
∑
i vi. Hence, h
s′l (
∑
i vi−'(l)) equals
1, and the LHS of both equalities in (1) are equal. If
∑
i vi =∈ S, then for every l∈ S
it holds that '(l) 
= ∑i vi. Hence, hs
′
l (
∑
i vi−'(l)) 
=1, and the LHS of both equalities in
(1) are distinct for every l in S. Thus, the Basic MTS outputs MEMBER if and only
if
∑
i vi belongs to S.
4.4. Robustness
First we observe that robustness with respect to malicious voters is achieved.
Lemma 4 (Cramer et al. [23]). An incorrectly formed ballot will be detected with
overwhelming probability.
Still, we need to show that the protocol cannot be disrupted by dishonest authorities.
We will need the following:
Lemma 5 (Abe [1]). Protocol-( is a honest veri?er zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge for ' and +m; l’s. The protocol is also honest veri?er zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge for 'j’s and tj; l’s held by honest provers.
Robustness with respect to malicious authorities is now guaranteed by the following
result
Theorem 6. Assume there are at most t¡m=2 participating authorities controlled by
an adversary. The goal of the adversary is to force the output of the scheme to be
incorrect (i.e., to be MEMBER when it should be NON-MEMBER and vice versa).
The adversary cannot succeed with non-negligible probability. When an attempt by
the adversary to force an incorrect output is detected, the identity of the authorities
controlled by the adversary will be exposed with overwhelming probability.
Proof. By Lemma 4 it suLces to consider the case where only correctly formed ballots
will be accounted for. Let T be the tally of the correctly formed ballots.
Observe that there are at least t honest authorities. Any such collection of authorities
will be able to decide correctly whether or not T belongs to S unless ((Gm; l; Mm; l))l is
not a permuted ElGamal re-encryption of ((G0; l; M0; l))l. If the latter holds, then Lemma
5 insures that with overwhelming probability the Verification Phase will detect it, the
tracing option invoked, and the identity of dishonest authorities exposed.
4.5. Privacy
We now show that under a standard computational assumption our Basic MTS does
not disclose any information pertaining the honest voter’s ballots besides that implied
by the output of the scheme.
A. Hevia, M. Kiwi / Theoretical Computer Science 321 (2004) 73–94 85
Secure function evaluation framework: We follow the model of secure multi-party
function evaluation proposed by Canetti [13], and hence, we cast our Basic MTS
protocol as computing a function fS on the voters’ votes, namely fS(v1; : : : ; vn)= b,
where b is 1 if
∑
i vi ∈ S and 0 otherwise.
Very roughly, in [13] the notion of security of a cryptographic protocol P computing
a function f is formalized by considering a setting with two diEerent “worlds”: the
“real world” and the “ideal world”. In the former, protocol P is executed on the
presence of some adversary A. In the latter, the following “ideal” protocol I is
executed instead: each party (authority or voter) privately delivers her input to an
(incorruptible) trusted party which then computes the desired function f on those
inputs, and privately hands the corresponding output of the function back to each
party. Protocol P is considered private and correct if, for every adversary A attacking
protocol P in the real world, we can exhibit an adversary SIM (called the simulator)
which can do “as well as A” but this time running on the ideal world. In our setting,
adversary SIM “doing as well as” A means that the combined output of adversary
A and the honest parties after running P is computationally indistinguishable from
the corresponding output of adversary SIM and honest parties after running the ideal
protocol I. This notion captures the property that protocol P cannot be less secure
than the most secure protocol I computing the same function f. The reader is refereed
to [13] for background and further details of the model.
In the analysis of this section we make the simplifying assumption that the signing
key generation procedure for authorities and voters is executed as the very 1rst step in
the MTS protocol. This assumption is not essential and can be removed at the expense
of a more involved argument.
The following two lemmas show that some of the building blocks of our Basic
MTS protocol (see Section 2.2) do not leak more information than the function they
compute.
Lemma 7 (Gennaro et al. [31], Jarecki [41]). Assume a broadcast channel is avail-
able and there are less than t¡m=2 dishonest authorities. Then, under the Decisional
Di>e Hellman assumption (DDH), the following hold:
(a) The DKG protocol privately and correctly computes the function DKG, which is
de?ned as “On any input, generate the authorities’ shares s1; : : : ; sm of a random
secret s, and value y= gs. Each authority receives as output one share si and the
value y. Each voter receives a copy of y”.
(b) The DEx protocol privately and correctly computes the function Exp de?ned as
“On input the authorities’ shares of a secret s and a value G, compute the value
Gs. The output is given to all the parties”.
Moreover, the simulator implied by part (a) (respectively, by part (b)) satisfy the condi-
tion that, on input a randomly chosen input y∗, it outputs a distribution indistinguish-
able from an execution of DKG (respectively, DEx) where the public output is y∗.
Lemma 8. Assume a broadcast channel is available and there are less than t¡m
dishonest authorities. Then, under the Decisional Di>e Hellman assumption (DDH),
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the MIX-network protocol (i.e. MIX Phase and Verification Phase) privately and
correctly computes the function MIX de?ned as: “On any input, compute a random
permutation of the list (h−‘)‘∈S and then encrypt each element of the list. All parties
receive the resulting list as output”.
Proof. It suLces to consider an ideal adversary SIMMIX that simulates the work of
all honest authorities while using the real adversary A to drive the strategy for the
dishonest authorities. The view of adversary A in the simulation is indistinguishable
from the one in a real execution of the protocol; otherwise we can either break the
semantic security of ElGamal encryption (or equivalently, the DDH assumption) or
contradict the zero-knowledge property of Protocol-(. Similarly, since t¡m, Lemma
5 and the semantic security of ElGamal encryption guarantee that the output of the
honest authorities and voters in the simulation follows the same distribution as in the
real execution of the MIX protocol.
MTS protocol is private: We conclude this section by showing that protocol MTS
does not leak any more information besides that implied by the output of the scheme.
Speci1cally, the following holds.
Theorem 9. Assume there are less than t¡m=2 dishonest authorities and n′ dishonest
voters controlled by an adversary A. For any such adversary A attacking MTS,
there exits a simulator SIM such that, for any list (vi)i of votes cast by the vot-
ers, the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable under the
Decisional Di>e Hellman assumption:
• The output of adversary A running on the real world when protocol MTS is
executed on input (vi)i, and
• The output of simulator SIM running on the ideal world where the trusted party
computes function fS over private inputs (vi)i.
Proof. Let SIMDKG, and SIMDEx denote the simulators for protocols DKG, and
DEx given by Lemma 7. We build a simulator SIM for the ideal protocol computing
function fS . Simulator SIM has black-box access to adversary A and works as
follows: First, it simulates the 1rst step of the Setup Phase of the MTS protocol
by running the signing key generation procedure on behalf of the honest authorities,
picking a random value s and running SIMDKG on target value y= gs. (Note that such
simulation allows SIM to know the “shared secret” s.) Analogously, shared values
s′‘ are computed by invoking SIMDKG once for each ‘.
Then, SIM runs SIMMIX to simulate the MIX Phase and Verification Phase.
SIMMIX outputs a list (Gm;‘;Mj; ‘)‘.
Once in the Voting Phase, SIM chooses random votes for all honest voters and
simulate their work during this phase (i.e., signing key generation, ballot preparation
and ballot posting). By querying adversary A, the simulator obtains the ballots for the
corrupted parties. Using the knowledge of secret s, the simulator extracts the values vi
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of the correctly cast votes. These values are used as input to function fS which returns
a bit b. 4
Then, for each ‘∈ S, SIM runs twice simulator SIMDEx; 1rst on input Gm;‘ and
target value G′‘=(Gm;‘)
s′‘ , and then on input Mm;‘ and target value M ′‘=(Mm;‘)
s′‘ .
If b=0, simulator SIM picks a random value Mˆ in Gq (the simulation fails if
Mˆ =M ′‘ for some ‘∈ S); otherwise, if b=1, simulator picks ‘∗ ∈ S at random and
sets Mˆ =M ′‘∗ . The simulator concludes by running SIMDEx on input G′‘ and target
value Mˆ .
By Lemmas 7 and 8, the simulation of the Setup, MIX and Verification phase
is correct. For the Voting Phase, the semantic security of the ElGamal encryptions
and the zero-knowledge property of the Ballot-Proof guarantee adversary A cannot
distinguish a simulated view from a view in the real protocol. Finally, for the Output
Phase we make the realistic assumption that q N . In such case, Lemma 7 guarantees
adversary SIM can, without being detected, control the simulation so as to satisfy the
condition (G′‘)
s=M ′‘ for some ‘∈ S if and only if b=1.
4.6. Universal veri?ability
Follows from the public veri1ability of the proofs of ballot validity (Proof-Ballot),
the proof of randomization and permutation (Proof-(), the proof of knowledge of
equality of discrete logarithms (Proof-Log) and the correctness proof associated to
the DKG protocol. Note that even in the case that there are more than t dishonest
authorities, although privacy might be compromised, passive observers will still be
able to ascertain whether the protocol was correctly performed.
4.7. E>ciency
We make the (realistic) assumption that n¿N¿t. Recall that a modular multiplica-
tion of O(k) bit sized numbers is our unit measure of computational costs.
The voter’s ballot consists of an ElGamal ciphertext and a (non-interactive) proof
that it is indeed a valid ballot. The size of both components is linear in the size
of an element of Z∗p, i.e., O(k). The work involved in the computation of both ballot
components is dominated by the modular exponentiations, of which there are a constant
number, each one requiring O(k) work. Hence, the computational and communication
complexity of the voter’s protocol is linear in the security parameter k—thus optimal.
Moreover, for any reasonable security parameter, a voter’s protocol remains the same
even if the number of voters varies. The work needed to verify that a voter sent in a
well-formed ballot equals the computational cost of making the ballot, i.e., O(k) per
voter. We stress that all the above characteristics of a voter’s protocol are inherited
from the electronic election scheme proposed in [23].
4 Recall that in the ideal model of [13], even though the simulator is not allowed to access the honest
parties’ inputs, all such inputs are indeed used by the trusted party to compute function fS .
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The work performed by the jth authority during the MIX Phase is dominated by
the cost of computing ((Gj; l; Mj; l))l. Since
Gj;l = Gj−1;'j(l)g
tj;l and Mj;l = Mj−1;'j(l)y
tj;l ;
the work performed by each authority during this phase is O(Nk). Analogously, the
work performed by each authority during the Verification Phase is O(Nk2). Finally,
since each run of the DEx protocol costs O(mk) per authority, the work performed by
each authority during the Output Phase is O((mN + n)k) (the O(nk) term is due to
the work performed in order to compute =
∏
i i, and =
∏
i i). The other tasks
performed by the authorities are not relevant in terms of computational costs. Thus, the
work performed by each authority is O((mN + n)k) provided they spend O(Nk2) work
during pre-computation (before the voting begins). The communication complexity (in
bits) incurred by each authority exceeds the computational complexity by a factor of k.
The computational complexity of verifying the authorities work is proportional to
the computational work performed by each authority during the corresponding phase.
5. Variants
More e>cient and alternative MTSs: If one is willing to forgo universal veri1a-
bility, more eLcient MIX-networks like the one proposed by Desmedt and Kurosawa
[25] might be used instead of Abe’s MIX-network in the MTS of Section 3. In this
case, the work done by each authority during the pre-computation stage is reduced to
O(kN ). In fact, the only essential characteristic our MTS scheme requires from the
underlying MIX-network is that it performs a random secret permutation and ElGa-
mal re-encryption of an input list of ElGamal ciphertexts. (The threshold decryption
capabilities utilized in the DEx protocol is a feature from the underlying encryption
scheme, not of the MIX-network.) Thus, other more eLcient recent MIX-network pro-
posals like those of NeE [44], Furukawa and Sako [28], Abe [2,3], and Jakobsson and
Juels [37], are good candidates for drop in replacements in the MIX module of the
MTS of Section 3. (All the latter preserve universal veri1ability.)
After submission of this paper, MIX-network proposals were put forth that relax
the universal veri1ability property while signi1cantly improving their overall eLciency
[34]. Also, it has been shown that eLciency can be improved if a non-negligible
probability of error in the veri1cation process can be tolerated [40] (the probability
of error goes down as the number of permuted elements increases, but still this is
probably unacceptable in the jury voting scenario).
Other homomorphic encryption schemes: Two properties are required of the encryp-
tion scheme used in this work; being a (semantically secure) homomorphism between
plaintexts and ciphertexts and enabling an eLcient indenti1cation of an encryption of 1.
Thus, cryptosystems like the one proposed by Paillier [47] can also be used to instan-
tiate our MTS. The MIX network of Furukawa and Sako [28], the proofs of equality
of encryption and the proofs of ballot validity can be easily adapted in order to be
implemented based on Paillier’s system. The resulting scheme can be proven secure
using an analysis similar to the one of Section 4.
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Unanimity voting: In case of unanimity voting S is a singleton. Therefore, there is
no need to use a MIX-network. Thus, the computational cost of the scheme is reduced
by skipping the pre-computation phase.
6. Applications
Testing membership of linear functions: We can modify our Basic MTS to allow
parties P1; : : : ; Pn to determine whether their private inputs vi ∈ Si, for i∈{1; : : : ; n},
are such that
∑
i civi ∈ S without revealing
∑
i civi. Here, S1; : : : ; Sn and S are publicly
known subsets of Zq, and c1; : : : ; cn is a publicly available 1xed sequence of integers.
This modi1cation of our Basic MTS allows to implement a weighted majority voting
electronic election scheme.
Scoring: Consider a person=entity which is willing to answer n very sensitive ques-
tions to a group of m evaluators. Assume the ith question accepts as answer any
element ai of Si. Each evaluator would like to learn whether the weighted score of the
answers
∑
i ciai exceeds a threshold (here again c1; : : : ; cn is a publicly available 1xed
sequence of integers). But, the respondent wishes to keep private the answers to each
individual question. This problem clearly reduces to the one discussed in the previous
paragraph. Thus, it follows that our Basic MTS can be used to solve it.
Private information retrieval: When restricted to a single voter V with a vote
v∈ S ′⊃ S, the proposed scheme yields a method of searching for v on the “database”
S without revealing neither the target v nor the contents of the database. The corre-
sponding proof of validity can be designed using 1-out-of-n proofs [21] as suggested in
[22]. This problem is a special case of what is known as private information retrieval
[19,32]. It encompasses situations where users are likely to be highly motivated to hide
what information they query from a database that contains particularly sensitive data,
e.g., stock quotes, patents or medical data.
7. Final comments
An interesting feature of our electronic jury voting scheme is that it combines parallel
lines of research concerning electronic voting: one based on MIX-networks [15] and
another on homomorphic encryptions [20,7,5]. We need homomorphic encryption in
order to hide the ballots content and compute the tally while keeping it secret. We need
ElGamal based MIX-networks in order to hide the value of the elements of S to which
the ElGamal encryption of the vote tally is compared. It is an interesting challenge
to design an electronic jury voting scheme in the model introduced in [20,7,5] which
does not rely on MIX-networks.
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Appendix A. Proof of knowledge for equality of discrete logarithms
In order to make the protocol of Fig. 1 non-interactive the Fiat–Shamir heuristic is
used. This maintains security in the random oracle model.
Appendix B. Proof of validity of ballot
In order to make the protocol of Fig. 2 non-interactive, the challenge c is computed
as a hash of the values , , a0, b0, a1, b1. This maintains security in the random oracle
model. In order to prevent vote duplication, the challenge must be made voter-speci1c.
Fig. 2. Proof of validity of encrypted vote (; )= (gr ; yrxv), r ∈R Zq, v∈{0; 1}.
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Following [30] this can be done by having voter Vi compute the challenge as the hash
of the values IDi, , , a0, b0, a1, b1, where IDi is a unique public string identifying
Vi.
Appendix C. Proof of randomization and permutation
We now describe a protocol due to Abe [1], denoted Protocol-(, which convinces
external veri1ers of the correctness of the randomization and permutation. It also con-
vinces honest servers that the permutations they have performed have not been canceled
(with non-negligible probability).
PROTOCOL-(
The following steps are repeated k times.
(1) The jth server receives ((G˜j−1; l; M˜ j−1; l))l. She then selects a random permutation
'˜j of {1; : : : ; N} and sends ((G˜j; l; M˜ j; l))l to the (j + 1)th server, where
G˜j;l = G˜j−1;'˜j(l)g
r˜j;'˜j (l) and M˜ j;l = M˜ j−1;'˜j(l)y
r˜j;'˜j (l) ;
where r˜j; l ∈R Zq. The last server publishes the list she receives.
(2) Veri1er publishes the challenge c∈R {0; 1}.
(3) If c=0, the jth server commits to j, '˜j, r˜j;1; : : : ; r˜j; N by broadcasting to all other
servers a commitment of these values. Commitments are opened once all of them
have been exchanged. The last server posts '˜= '˜1 ◦ · · ·◦ '˜m and ,˜m; l=
∑
j r˜j; '˜j(l).
If c=1, the jth server calculates ’j = '−1j ◦ ’j−1 ◦ '˜j and !˜j; l= !˜j−1; '˜j(l) +
r˜j; '˜j(l) − tj;’j−1◦'˜j(l) (for j=0, ’0 equals the identity permutation, and !˜0; l=0).
The last server publishes ’=’m and all !˜m; l’s.
(4) If c=0 each server and veri1er check that all commitments where opened cor-
rectly, that '˜ and ,˜m; l’s are correctly made, and whether
G˜m;l
G0;'˜(l)
= g,˜m;l and
M˜m;l
M0;'˜(l)
= y,˜m;l
and in case c=1, whether
G˜m;l
Gm;’(l)
= g!˜m;l and
M˜m;l
Mm;’(l)
= y!˜m;l :
If the veri1cation fails, the randomization and permutation step is declared not
VALID and all servers show the 'j’s and ti; j’s. This makes all computations
traceable and dishonest servers are identi1ed.
Although the above protocol is interactive, a non-interactive version can be derived
using the Fiat–Shamir heuristic by computing the challenge via a hash function (the
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resulting protocol remains secure under the random oracle model). In this case, the
non-interactive proof consists of the outputs of the last server.
References
[1] M. Abe, Universally veri1able MIX-net with veri1cation work independent of the number of
MIX-servers, Proc. EuroCrypt’98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1403, Springer, Berlin,
1998, pp. 437–447.
[2] M. Abe, Mix-networks on permutation networks, Proc. Asiacrypt’99, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol. 1716, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 258–273.
[3] M. Abe, F. Hoshino, Remarks on mix-networks on permutation networks, Proc. PKC’01, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, Vol. 1992, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 317–324.
[4] O. Baudron, P.A. Fouque, D. Pointcheval, G. Poupard, J. Stern, Practical multi-candidate election system,
Proc. CCS’01, ACM, New York, 2001, pp. 274–283.
[5] J. Benaloh, Veri1able secret-ballot elections, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Computer Science,
Yale University, September 1987.
[6] J. Benaloh, D. Tuinstra, Receipt-free secret-ballot elections, Proc. STOC’94, ACM, New York, 1994,
pp. 544–553.
[7] J. Benaloh, M. Yung, Distributing the power of a government to enhance the privacy of voters, Proc.
PODC’86, ACM, New York, 1986, pp. 52–62.
[8] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, A. Wigderson, Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant
distributed computation, Proc. STOC’88, ACM, New York, 1988, pp. 1–10.
[9] D. Boneh, P. Golle, Almost entirely correct mixing with applications to voting, Proc. CCS’02, ACM,
New York, 2002, pp. 68–77.
[10] F. Boudot, ELcient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval, Proc. EuroCrypt’00,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 431–444.
[11] F. Boudot, B. Schoenmakers, J. Traore, A fair and eLcient solution to the socialist millionaires’ problem,
Discrete Appl. Math. 111 (1–2) (2001) 23–36.
[12] C. Boyd, A new multiple key cipher and an improved voting scheme, Proc. EuroCrypt’89, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 434, Springer, Berlin, 1989, pp. 617–625.
[13] R. Canneti, On the composition of multiparty protocols, J. Cryptology 13(1) (2000) 143–202.
[14] R. Canetti, S. Goldwasser, An eLcient threshold public key cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack, Proc. EuroCrypt’99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1592, Springer, Berlin,
1999, pp. 90–106.
[15] D.L. Chaum, Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms, Comm. ACM
24 (2) (1981) 84–88.
[16] D. Chaum, Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and disruption equivalent to breaking RSA,
Proc. EuroCrypt’88, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 330, Springer, Berlin, 1988, pp. 177–
182.
[17] D. Chaum, C. CrWepeau, I. DamgXard, Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols, Proc. Crypto’87,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 293, Springer, Berlin, 1987, pp. 462–462.
[18] D. Chaum, T.P. Pedersen, Wallet databases with observers, Proc. Crypto’92, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol. 740, Springer, Berlin, 1992, pp. 89–105.
[19] B. Chor, O. Goldreich, E. Kushilevitz, M. Sudan, Private information retrieval, Proc. FOCS’95, IEEE,
New York, 1995, pp. 41–50.
[20] J.D. Cohen, M.J. Fischer, A robust and veri1able cryptographically secure election scheme, Proc.
FOCS’85, IEEE, New York, 1985, pp. 372–382.
[21] R. Cramer, I. DamgXard, B. Schoenmakers, Proofs of partial knowledge simpli1ed design of witness,
Proc. Crypto’94, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 839, Springer, Berlin, 1994, pp. 174–187.
[22] R. Cramer, M.K. Franklin, B. Schoenmakers, M. Yung, Multi-authority secret-ballot elections with
linear work, Proc. EuroCrypt’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1070, Springer, Berlin, 1996,
pp. 72–83.
A. Hevia, M. Kiwi / Theoretical Computer Science 321 (2004) 73–94 93
[23] R. Cramer, R. Gennaro, B. Schoenmakers, A secure and optimally eLcient multi-authority election
scheme, Proc. EuroCrypt’97, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1233, Springer, Berlin, 1997,
pp. 103–118.
[25] Y. Desmedt, K. Kurosawa, How to break a practical MIX and design a new one, Proc. EuroCrypt’00,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 557–572.
[26] T. ElGamal, A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, IEEE
Trans. Inform. Theory IT-31 (4) (1985) 469–472.
[27] A. Fujioka, T. Okamoto, K. Ohta, A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections,
in: AusCrypt’92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 718, Springer, Berlin, 1992, pp. 244–251.
[28] J. Furukawa, K. Sako, An eLcient scheme for proving a shuRe. Proc. Crypto’01, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Vol. 2139, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 368–387.
[29] R. Gennaro, Manuscript, 1995.
[30] R. Gennaro, Achieving independence eLciently and securely, Proc. PODC’95, ACM, New York, 1995,
pp. 130–136.
[31] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, T. Rabin, Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based
cryptosystems, Proc. EuroCrypt’99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1592, Springer, Berlin,
1999, pp. 295–310.
[32] Y. Gertner, Y. Ishai, E. Kushilevitz, T. Malkin, Protecting data privacy in private information retrieval
schemes, Proc. STOC’98, ACM, New York, 1998, pp. 151–160.
[33] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, A. Wigderson, Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology
of cryptographic protocol design, Proc. FOCS’86, IEEE, New York, 1986, pp. 174–187.
[34] P. Golle, S. Zhong, D. Boneh, M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, Optimistic mixing for exit-polls, Proc.
Asiacrypt’02, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2501, Springer, Berlin, 2002, pp. 451–465.
[35] M. Hirt, K. Sako, ELcient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption, Proc. EuroCrypt’00,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1807, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 539–556.
[36] M. Jakobsson, A practical mix, Proc. EuroCrypt’98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1403,
Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 448–461.
[37] M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, Millimix: mixing in small batches, Technical Report 99-33, DIMACS, 1999.
[38] M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts, Proc. Asiacrypt’00,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1976, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 162–178.
[39] M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, An optimally robust hybrid mix network, in: PODC’01, ACM, New York,
2001, pp. 284–292.
[40] M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, R. Rivest, Making MIX-nets robust for electronic voting by randomized partial
checking, Prof. USENIX Security Symposium’02, USENIX, 2002, pp. 339–353.
[41] S. Jarecki, ELcient threshold cryptosystems, Ph.D. Thesis, MIT, LCS, June 2001.
[42] T. Malkin, A study of secure database access and general two-party computation, Ph.D. Thesis, MIT,
LCS, February 2000.
[44] C.A. NeE, A veri1able secret shuRe and its application to e-voting, Proc. CCS’01, ACM, New York,
2001, pp. 116–125.
[45] W. Ogata, K. Kurosawa, K. Sako, K. Takatani, Fault tolerant anonymous channel, Proc. ICICS’97,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1334, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 440–444.
[46] M. Ohkubo, M. Abe, A length-invariant hybrid mix, Proc. Asiacrypt’00, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol. 1976, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 178–191.
[47] P. Paillier, Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes, Proc. EuroCrypt’99,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1592, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 223–238.
[48] C. Park, K. Itoh, K. Kurosawa, ELcient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme, Proc.
EuroCrypt’93, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 765, Springer, Berlin, 1993, pp. 248–259.
[49] T.P. Pedersen, Distributed provers with applications to undeniable signatures, Proc. EuroCrypt’91,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 547, Springer, Berlin, 1991, pp. 221–242.
[50] B. P1tzmann, Breaking an eLcient anonymous channel, Proc. EuroCrypt’94, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Vol. 950, Springer, Berlin, 1994, pp. 332–340.
[51] K. Sako, J. Kilian, Secure voting using partially compatible homomorphisms, Proc. Crypto’94, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 839, Springer, Berlin, 1994, pp. 411–424.
94 A. Hevia, M. Kiwi / Theoretical Computer Science 321 (2004) 73–94
[52] K. Sako, J. Kilian, Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme—a practical solution to the implementation of
a voting booth, Proc. EuroCrypt’95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 921, Springer, Berlin,
1995, pp. 393–403.
[53] B. Schoenmakers, A simple publicly veri1able secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic
voting, Proc. Crypto’99, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1666, Springer, Berlin, 1999,
pp. 148–164.
[54] P. Syverson, D. Goldschlag, M. Reed, Anonymous connections and onion routing, Proc. IEEE Symp.
on Security and Privacy, IEEE, New York, 1997, pp. 44–54.
